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caused by crowded roosting areas and sharing of roosts by 
multiple species. This behavior provides opportunities for 
transmission of Bartonella bacteria or exchange of infected 
ectoparasites, such as Cyclopodia spp. (8), although the 
precise roles of these 2 processes are unknown.
Although no human cases of Bartonella spp. infection 
have been reported in Vietnam, Bartonella spp. have been 
identified in febrile humans elsewhere in Southeast Asia 
(9) and are also common in rats in southern Vietnam (10). 
Because close contact with bats (i.e., through manure farm-
ing and consumption of bat meat) and potential arthropod 
vectors (i.e., through handling and consumption of fruit) is 
common in parts of Vietnam, targeted screening of bats and 
their human contacts might improve our understanding of 
the zoonotic potential of these bacteria and their potential 
effect on public health.
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Table. Prevalence of Bartonella spp. in bats from 2 sites in Dong Nai, Vietnam, 2013 
Bat species 
No. Bartonella spp.–positive bats/no. bats trapped (%) 
Cat Tien National Park Dong Nai Nature Reserve Total 
Cynopterus sphinx* 0/0 0/14 0/14 (0) 
Hipposideros armiger† 2/6 0/0 2/6 (33.3) 
Hipposideros larvatui† 3/5 0/0 3/5 (60) 
Megaerops niphanae* 0/0 ½ 1/2 (50) 
Megaderma spasma† 0/0 1/2 1/2 (50) 
Megaderma lyra‡ 1/1 0/0 1/1 (100) 
Rhinolophus acuminatus† 0/0 9/17 9/17 (52.9) 
Rhinolophus chaseli† 2/5 0/0 2/5 (40) 
Rhinolophus sinicus† 0/3 2/4 2/7 (28.6) 
Rhinolophus luctus† 0/1 0/0 0/1 (0) 
Total 8/21 (38.1) 13/39 (33.3) 21/60 (35) 
*Fruit-eating. 
†Insectivorous. 
‡Carnivorous. 
 
To the Editor: Influenza virus subtype H6 was first 
isolated from a turkey in 1965 in the United States (1) and 
was subsequently found in other parts of the world (2). 
Over the past several decades, the prevalence of H6 vi-
rus has dramatically increased in wild and domestic birds 
(2–4). In China, highly pathogenic influenza A(H5N1), 
low pathogenicity influenza (H9N2), and H6 are the most 
prevalent avian influenza viruses among poultry (5). Al-
though only 1 case of H6 virus infection in a human has 
been reported worldwide (6), several biological character-
istics of H6 viruses indicate that they are highly infectious 
to mammals. Approximately 34% of H6 viruses circulat-
ing in China have enhanced affinity to human-like recep-
tors (ɑ-2,6 NeuAcGal) (2). H6 viruses can also infect mice 
without prior adaptation (2,7), and some H6 viruses can 
be transmitted efficiently among guinea pigs (2). To evalu-
ate the potential threat of H6 viruses to human health, we 
conducted a systematic serologic study in populations oc-
cupationally exposed to H6 viruses.
During 2009–2011, a total of 15,689 serum samples 
were collected from live poultry market workers, back-
yard poultry farmers, large-scale poultry farmers, poultry-
slaughter factory workers, and wild bird habitat work-
ers in 22 provinces in mainland China. A/chicken/Y94/
Guangdong/2011 (H6N2), a representative isolate of pre-
dominant H6 viruses in mainland China, was used for the 
serologic testing (online Technical Appendix Table 1, Fig-
ures 1, 2, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/21/7/15-0135-
Techapp1.pdf). Hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay 
was performed for all serum samples, and samples with an 
HI titer ≥20 were verified by a microneutralization (MN) 
assay, as indicated by World Health Organization guide-
lines (8). An MN result of ≥20 was considered positive.
The HI result was ≥20 for H6N2 virus in 298 of the 
15,689 specimens, and the MN result was positive in 63 
of the 298 specimens (overall seropositivity range 20–320, 
mean 32.7, 0.4%) (online Technical Appendix Table 2). 
The proportion of group members who were seropositive 
differed significantly according to occupational exposure 
(p = 0.0125). Seropositivity was highest among workers in 
live poultry markets, backyard poultry farmers, and work-
ers in wild bird habitats (0.66%, 0.42%, and 0.51%, respec-
tively) (Table). According to χ2 test results, seropositivity 
among workers in live poultry markets was significantly 
higher than that among large-scale poultry farmers (p = 
0.0015, adjusted ɑ = 0.005. Analysis by unconditional lo-
gistic regression model showed that exposure to live poul-
try markets was a risk factor for human infection with avian 
influenza H6 virus (odds ratio 2.1, 95% CI 1.27–3.47).
Seropositivity did not differ significantly among male 
and female persons tested (p = 0.08) (Table). No children 
were positive for the H6N2 virus. For other age groups, 
seropositivity ranged from 0.25% to 0.45%, but differences 
were not significant (p>0.05) (Table).
Of the 22 provinces from which serum specimens were 
collected, 11 were northern provinces and 11 were southern 
provinces. Positive specimens were detected in all southern 
provinces. In northern China, no seropositive results were 
detected in Henan, Liaoning, or Jilin Provinces. According 
to χ2 test results, seropositivity in southern China was sig-
nificantly higher than seropositivity in northern China (p = 
0.0375) (Table).
Human infection with influenza H6 virus in mainland 
China has not been reported, but 63 serum specimens tested 
in our study were positive for the H6 virus. This level of se-
ropositivity is much higher than that for highly pathogenic 
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Table. Seropositivity of occupationally exposed populations for the influenza (H6N2) virus, China, 2009–2011* 
Population 
Total no. serum 
samples  
Mean titer for 
MN ≥20 
No. serum samples 
with MN ≥20 
Seropositivity (95% 
CI) 
Odds ratio† 
(95% CI) 
Total 15,689 32.70 63 0.40 (0.40–0.41)  
Occupation      
 Live poultry market 3,950 43.08 26 0.66 (0.64–0.68) 2.10 (1.27–3.47) 
 Poultry farm 3,762 25.71 7 0.19 (0.18–0.19) 0.40 (0.18–0.87) 
 Backyard poultry farm 4,324 26.67 18 0.42 (0.40–0.43) 1.05 (0.61–1.82) 
 Poultry slaughter factory 1,235 30.00 2 0.16 (0.15–0.17) 0.38 (0.09–1.57) 
 Wild bird habitat 788 20.00 4 0.51 (0.47–0.54) 1.28 (0.47–3.54) 
 Other 1,630 23.33 6 0.37 (0.35–0.39) 0.91 (0.39–2.11) 
Sex      
 F 7,620 24.29 28 0.37 (0.36–0.38) Reference 
 M 8,069 39.39 35 0.43 (0.42–0.44) 1.18 (0.72–1.94) 
Age group, y       
 Children, 14 74 – 0 0 0 (0) 
 Youth, 15–24 1,168 20.00 3 0.26 (0.24–0.27) 0.75 (0.19–3.00) 
 Adult, 25–59 1,2450 34.07 54 0.43 (0.43–0.44) 1.27 (0.54–2.94) 
 Elderly, >60 1,748 13.33 6 0.34 (0.33–0.36) Reference 
 No age record 249 – 0 0 – 
Geographic distribution     
 South 10,522 32.00 50 0.48 (0.47–0.48) Reference 
 North 5,167 35.38 13 0.25 (0.24–0.26) 0.59 (0.30–1.15) 
*MN, microneutralization;  –, not applicable. 
†Odds ratios were calculated by using unconditional logistic regression model (SPSS 17.0, Armonk, NY, USA).  
 
avian influenza A(H5N1) virus, for which only 2 of the se-
rum specimens we tested were positive (data not shown), 
but much lower than the seropositivity level for low 
pathogenicity avian influenza A(H9N2) virus; 3.4% of the 
samples tested were positive for A/Chicken/Hong Kong/
G9/1997(H9N2)–like virus (data not shown). A previous 
US study has reported H6N2-positive antibodies in veteri-
narians (9). Our results and the veterinarian study indicate 
that the H6N2 virus could infect humans. 
In our study, positive samples were detected in 19 of 
22 provinces and in all tested worker populations, suggest-
ing that the H6 virus has been broadly circulating in birds 
in China. Live poultry market exposure is the major risk 
factor for human infection with avian influenza H6 virus. 
The limitation of this study is that antigen selection may 
not accurately detect neutralization antibodies for differ-
ent subtypes of H6 viruses. Surveillance of the H6 virus 
in birds and occupationally exposed populations should be 
strengthened for pandemic preparedness.
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To the Editor: Middle East respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was first identified among hu-
mans in 2012 in Saudi Arabia (1). As of February 5, 2015, 
a total of 971 MERS cases and 356 associated deaths had 
been confirmed (2). Because MERS is a zoonotic disease, it 
is essential that the animal reservoirs and hosts that sustain 
virus circulation in nature be identified.
Seroepidemiologic and virologic studies have dem-
onstrated evidence of MERS-CoV infection in dromedary 
camels (Camelus dromedarius) in the Arabian Peninsula 
(3), and viruses isolated from dromedaries appear capable 
of infecting the human respiratory tract (4). In some in-
stances, MERS-CoV infection in dromedaries has preced-
ed infection in humans (5), indicating that dromedaries 
are a natural host for MERS-CoV and a possible source 
of human infection. Thus, it is important to define the 
geographic range of MERS-CoV infection in camels and 
the species of camelids that are infected by MERS-CoV 
in nature.
Two species of camels exist: 1-hump dromedaries (C. 
dromedarius) and 2-hump Bactrian camels (C. bactrianus). 
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